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FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND THE CHALLENGE
TO MAINTAIN BALANCE IN THE DUAL BANKING
SYSTEM
ROBERT C. EAGER1 AND C. F. MUCKENFUSS, 1112
I. INTRODUCTION
In early 2004, the Comptroller of the Currency
(Comptroller or OCC) adopted revised preemption regulations
providing that national banks engage in banking effectively subject
only to the National Bank (NB) Act under the regulatory and
enforcement authority of the OCC.3 Although controversial, this
regulation represents a coherent response to the realities and
demands of a national marketplace for financial services. State
response to the OCC has been swift and forceful. In comments on
the OCC rules,4 in litigation,5 and in Congressional oversight
hearings,6 state bank regulators, state attorneys general, consumer
groups, and members of Congress have decried the effects of these
rules on the dual banking system and federalism7 and questioned
1. Robert C. Eager, Partner, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, LLP., Washington D.C.
2. C.F. Muckenfuss III, Partner, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, LLP., Washington
D.C.
3. See 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34 (2004).
4. See, e.g., Letter from Mark Rotenberg, Executive Director, ELECTRONIC
PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER; Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Deputy Counsel,
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER; Kerry Smith, Clerk, ELECTRONIC
PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER; and Edmund Mierzwinski, Consumer Program
Director, U.S. PIRG, to the OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (April
8, 2003), available at http://www.pirg.org/atm99/pdfs/visit.pdf (last visited Feb. 13,
2004).
5. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae, State and State Banking Officials in Support
of John P. Burke, Banking Commissioner, Wachovia v. Burke, Civ. Action No. 3:03
CV 0738 (JCH) (Aug. 26, 2003).
6. See infra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
7. "Dual banking system" refers to the parallel state and federal structures for
the charter, supervision, and regulation of depository institutions. It encompasses
both the powers, activities, and competitiveness of chartered banks as well as the
powers, policies, and institutional structure of the bank regulatory agencies at the
state and federal levels (including the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) and Federal
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the wisdom and authority of the OCC.8 While there can be no
certainty, if the past is a guide, there will be Congressional
discussion, but no legislation, and the courts will substantially
sustain the OCC position.9
In the existing multi-state marketplace, a uniform national
bank system based on preemption undoubtedly presents a major
challenge to the dual banking system and state bank regulation. If
state banks cannot operate multistate with the same efficiency and
effectiveness as national banks, the state banking system
ultimately will be irreparably undermined. Responding positively
to this challenge is strategically important for all banks, national
and state, because both have a significant stake in the choice
afforded by a strong and balanced dual banking system.
It is important to the future of the dual banking system to
mount a positive response to the preemption challenge, even while
the contentious and adversarial processes already underway continue
under their own momentum. By using the existing conceptual
framework and legal tools, a robust dual banking system can be
maintained. That is a constructive and necessary response to the
broad preemption provided to all federal institutions under the OCC
and Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) rules.
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as the primary federal regulators of state-
chartered banks). Throughout the history of the dual banking system, one of its most
important features has been a relative balance between the state and national
systems, both in numerical terms and in the perception among bankers of the relative
attractiveness of the two types of charters.
8. Congressional Review of OCC Preemption Before the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations House Committee on Financial Services, 109th Congress
(Jan. 28, 2004), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/012804tm.pdf
(statement of the Honorable Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, State of Iowa on
behalf of the National Association of Attorneys General at 3, n.5, 6).
9. See Final Rules on National Bank Preemption, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1910 (Jan.
13, 2004) (noting that the OCC's preemption standard conforms with Supreme Court
precendent); see also Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25,
34 (1996) ("where Congress has not expressly conditioned the grant of power upon a
grant of state permission, the Court has ordinarily found that no such condition
applies" (internal quotation omitted)); see generally Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (affording deference to agency
constructions of the statutes which they administer). Contra, Letter from Rep. Frank
Barney (D-Mass.), et. al. to John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency (Feb.
11, 2004), available at http://www.house.gov/banking-democrats/Ltr-
OCCHawkepreemptiondelarules.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2004) ("We are deeply
concerned that [the new rules] represent a fundamental shift in bank regulation that
goes to the very heart of the federal system.").
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In the national financial services marketplace, consumers
and providers benefit when banks can provide products and
services under a single legal framework applicable across state
lines. Bank customers and the economy also have benefited from
the diversity, innovation and checks provided by the dual banking
system. From the perspective of all parties - consumers, financial
institutions, and regulators, - further development of a
framework of state bank regulation and supervision that is
effective, efficient, and seamless across state lines is the right goal.
But state bank regulation and the dual banking system will remain
vital and strong only if the state system is able to provide complete
interstate parity for state banks.
The proposed positive response is well grounded in current
law and the established policy of Congress to maintain equilibrium
in the dual banking system. In response to the challenges
presented by the 1978 Marquette case ° and the 1994 Riegle-Neal
interstate banking legislation," Congress enacted federal statutes
based on the concept that state as well as national banks must be
able to operate under a single law when they do business across
state lines. Section 104 of the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
similarly provides national parity for all banks and their affiliates.
The interstate supervisory regime developed by the Conference of
State Bank Supervisors since 1994 also relies on home state law
and regulation.
In this article we review those federal and state actions over
the last quarter century that were taken to maintain balance in the
dual banking system by allowing state banks to operate across
state lines under uniform rules supported by a preemptive federal
statute. With the federal preemption provided by these tools, the
existing parity framework can, and we believe should, be further
developed so that banks with state charters can compete safely,
efficiently, and fairly in the national marketplace for financial
services substantially under their home state law and regulation.
Although further federal legislation may not be required to
10. See Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439
U.S. 299 (1978).
11. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 238 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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develop such a parity framework, specific, limited, clarifying
amendments to current law could facilitate the completion of a
parallel, substantially uniform state system.
2
After a brief historical background and review of the
recent OCC preemption rules in Part II, this article will
discuss the federal and state laws and actions that
together provide a framework for competitive parity in
the dual banking system as well as a basis for further
actions to maintain balance within that system.
Part III considers the landmark Marquette National
Bank v. First Omaha Service Corp3 case (Marquette),
and § 27 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 4 (§ 27),
passed two years after the decision in Marquette.
Together, Marquette and § 27 allow both national and
state chartered banks to lend interstate at the rates
permitted under the usury laws of the state where they
are "located."
Part IV discusses the framework established by the
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act of 1994 (Riegle-Neal I) and subsequent
Riegle-Neal Amendments Act of 1997 (Riegle-Neal
11)." The Riegle-Neal interstate banking legislation
(1994 and 1997) enacted substantively identical
provisions to describe the law applicable to interstate
national and state banks with the stated purpose of
providing parity for state banks with national banks. At
a minimum, this provision means that state banks with
branches in another state can operate with parity to
national banks. The legislative history supports a
12. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
13. Marquette, 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
14. 12 U.S.C. 1831d(a) (2000).
15. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L.
103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified at various sections of 12 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
Riegle-Neal I]; the Riegle-Neal Amendments Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-24 (1997)
(amending 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(j)) [hereinafter Riegle-Neal II].
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broader parity for state and national banks through a
framework in which the home state law of an interstate
state bank applies as the National Bank Act applies to
an interstate national bank.
" Part V discusses § 104 of the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act 6 (GLBA). GLBA authorized a broad range of
financial affiliations for banks. Section 104 of this
legislation provides express federal preemption for an
unprecedented range of companies: not only all state
and federal insured banks and thrifts, but also all
"financial" affiliates of all those insured depository
institutions. Under § 104, any state law that is
discriminatory or unduly burdensome (as defined) for
any such entity is preempted.
* Part VI briefly discusses the potential application of the
Interstate Commerce Clause in the U.S. Constitution1
7
to restrict the ability of the states to impose barriers and
burdens on interstate commerce (the "negative"
Commerce Clause).
* Part VII discusses the efforts of the states, under the
leadership of Conference of State Bank Supervisors
(CSBS), to provide a seamless regulatory and
supervisory regime for state banks operating on a multi-
state basis. 8
16. 15 U.S.C. § 6701 (2001 & Supp. 2003).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
18. The enactment of Riegle-Neal II, which was spearheaded by CSBS, and the
CSBS cooperative agreements advance the export model - that home state law and
regulation should follow a bank chartered by that state when it establishes branches
and engages in business in other states. These CSBS actions break new ground by
recognizing the need for federal enabling legislation and by contracting the role of
each state banking department in its role as a host state agency. The state bank
supervisors and CSBS have in practical terms ceded some of their jurisdiction in
order to permit the state banking system as a whole to function in a manner more
parallel to the national banking system. This approach represents a major, if not
widely acknowledged, state innovation in keeping with the creative tradition of the
dual banking system.
2004]
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Part VIII suggests actions that might be taken to
maintain balance in the dual banking system, including
rulemaking under existing laws by the FDIC or Fed, use
of amicus briefs to develop the state bank position in
banking preemption cases, targeted federal statutory
amendments, and creation of a working group of banks
to develop priorities and provide resources for a
concerted effort to maintain balance in the dual
banking system.
Before proceeding with this discussion, three related points
should be highlighted. First of all, the approach suggested in this
article is not without difficulty. In order to effect a seamless web
of regulation across state lines, state regulators must both cede
sovereignty and cooperate effectively. Issues of budget and
resources, quality and effectiveness of regulation, the role of the
FDIC and the Fed and a myriad of technical and mechanical issues
must be faced, but are beyond the scope of this article.
Second, we believe that there should be urgency in state
responses to the OCC's actions. A healthy dual banking system
includes both state and national institutions that are local, regional
and national and that provide each system perspective and
adequate financial and political resources. If state banks cannot
maintain parity with national banks operating with broad federal
preemption in today's interstate banking environment, there is the
distinct possibility of transactions that would remove, one-by-one,
a critical mass of large, interstate state banks 9 and fundamentally
upset the essential balance in the dual banking system. Providing
parity under a parallel framework permitting uniform multistate
operations by state banks is unquestionably necessary. It seems
highly unlikely that any major multistate national bank would ever
convert to a state charter if it could not keep the ability to operate
under a uniform legal framework across state lines.
19. The present dual banking system draws strength from the presence of one or
two very large state banks in a number of states (e.g., Georgia, North Carolina,
Virginia, Ohio, Michigan, among other ), as well as the concentration of state banks
in such states as New York, Alabama, and Utah.
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The third point flows from the first two. A failure to
commit the necessary resources, intellectual, political and
otherwise, to assure a workable framework for multistate state
banks is likely to result in the loss of the very substantial benefits
that the dual banking system provides for all banks, for bank
customers and for the economy.
II. BACKGROUND: HISTORY AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The recent OCC rules may be viewed as only the latest
chapter in a history in which federal and state law have attempted
to meet, and often catch up to, the needs of an increasingly
integrated national marketplace.
A. Brief Historical Overview
Since the creation of the national banking system in the
1860s, the United States has had a "dual" banking system.
Although some drafters of the National Bank (NB) Act thought
the new federal system might replace the existing state banking
system in each state, a dual banking system resulted instead.
Nevertheless, the concept of competitive parity has its origins in
the NB Act itself, which explicitly provides that national banks
must look to home state law in such areas as usury, trust powers,
and, as added by the 1920's McFadden Act, intrastate branching. °
These provisions ensured that national banks would have
competitive parity with home-state state banks in an intrastate
banking framework. The later establishment of the Federal
Reserve System and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) insurance treated national and state chartered banks
equally and thus supported competitive parity in the dual banking
system.
As banking expanded to become an increasingly multi-state
business after the 1960's, the advantages of federal preemption
became more apparent. The development of multi-state credit
cards and interstate offers of consumer credit signaled the
20. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 36, 85, 92a (2001).
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development of a banking (now financial services) marketplace
that is truly national in scope. The federal agencies that charter
and regulate federal banking institutions, the OCC for national
banks and the OTS for federal savings associations, have acted to
ensure that state regulation does not impinge on activities of these
federal instrumentalities.
The nationalization of financial markets required both
Congress and state banking regulators, through the CSBS, to take
a fresh look at the needs of state banks. In the last two decades,
Congress has expressed a national policy of parity for state and
national banks in the national financial market while also
extending federal preemption to all bank-affiliated providers of
financial services. Before turning to the federal statutory
framework providing competitive parity for state banks in an
interstate environment, we will briefly review the debate over the
recent OCC preemption actions.
B. Recent OCC Preemption Actions
The OCC recently restated and codified its regulations
regarding the extent to which the operations of national banks are
subject to state laws. On Aug. 5, 2003, the OCC issued an order
preempting several provisions of the Georgia Fair Lending Act
(GFLA). 2' This action paralleled preemption actions and rules by
the OTS and represented only the most visible in a number of
preemption determinations concerning new "predatory" lending
laws enacted in other states.22 The OCC also published a notice of
proposed rulemaking to amend 12 C.F.R. parts 7 and 34 in order
21. Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264 (Aug. 5, 2003). In
its order, the OCC concluded that "the conditions imposed by the GFLA on the real
estate lending activities of national banks" do not apply to national banks or national
bank operating subsidiaries engaging in real estate lending activities in Georgia. Id.
at 46,281.
22. See OTS Op. Chief Counsel, P-2003-1 (Jan. 21, 2003), available at
http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/56301.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2004) (asserting that
federal law preempts that application of various provisions of the GFLA to federal
savings associations and their operating subsidiaries and citing several similar OTS




to clarify the applicability of state law to nationally chartered
banks.23 On January 13, 2004, the OCC published final rules
amending parts 7 and 34, which took effect on Feb. 12, 2004.24
1. Preemption of Georgia Fair Lending Act
The OCC's order preempting the real estate lending
provisions of the GFLA was illustrative of the agency's policy of
applying general preemption principles to questions concerning
the regulation of interstate lending. 25 The OCC determined that
the GFLA's provisions affecting a national bank's ability to engage
in real estate lending, the rate of interest a national bank may
charge for a loan, and a national bank's ability to charge non-
interest fees were preempted because "[u]nder applicable Federal
preemption principles, based on the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution and articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, a state
may not modify a Congressional grant of power to national banks
by limiting, conditioning, or otherwise impermissibly affecting a
national bank's exercise of that power.
'' 27
2. Revised OCC Preemption Regulations
On Jan. 13, 2004, the OCC published a final rule to "specify
the types of state laws that do not apply to national banks' lending
and deposit taking activities and the types of state laws that
generally do apply to national banks., 28 The regulations explicitly
provide that state laws do not apply to national banks if such laws
"obstruct, impair, or condition" the ability of national banks to
23. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,119 (Aug. 5, 2003).
24. Final Rules on National Bank Preemption, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904.
25. Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264.
26. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
27. Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,264. The OCC
pointed out that national banks' authority to engage in real estate lending derives
from federal law. Id.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2003); 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).
28. Final Rules on National Bank Preemption, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1904.
2004]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
exercise their federally authorized deposit-taking, 9 consumer
lending,3" and other powers.3 However, state laws that only
incidentally affect the deposit-taking, lending, or other operations
of a national bank are not preempted.32 The OCC also revised its
rule concerning its visitorial powers to make plain that it alone has
the authority to bring enforcement actions against national banks
and that state authorities cannot bring an action against a national
bank or subsidiary in a state court.33 On Jan. 7, 2004, when the
OCC issued the new regulations, Comptroller of the Currency
John D. Hawke, Jr., issued a statement noting:
The types of laws that the regulation preempts -
including laws regulating loan terms, imposing
conditions on lending and deposit relationships, and
requiring state licenses - create impediments to the
ability of national banks to exercise powers that are
granted under federal law. These laws create higher
costs and operational burdens that the banks either
must shoulder, or pass on to consumers, or that may
have the practical effect of driving them out of
certain businesses.34
The OCC stated that its authority to issue the new
regulations derives from 12 U.S.C. §§ 93a and 371. 35 Section 93a
grants the OCC authority "to prescribe rules and regulations to
carry out the responsibilities of the office" and § 371 grants the
29. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4007(b) (2004).
30. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008(d), 34.3, 34.4 (2004).
31. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4009(b) (2004).
32. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Preemption Final
Rule Questions and Answers (Jan. 7, 2004), available at, http://www.occ.treas.gov/
2004-3dPreemptionQNAs.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2004). The OCC noted that
"[t]hese include laws on contracts, rights to collect debts, acquisition and transfer of
property, taxation, zoning, crimes, and torts." Id.
33. Final Rule on Visitorial Powers, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895 (Jan. 13, 2004).
34. Press Release, John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Statement of
Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr. Regarding the Issuance of
Regulations Concerning Preemption and Visitorial Powers (Jan. 7, 2004), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/2004-3aComptrollersstatement.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
35. Final Rules on National Bank Preemption, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1908-09.
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OCC authority to regulate national banks' real estate lending
activities. 36
In response to concerns that the preemption of state
predatory lending laws will expose consumers to abusive and
predatory lending practices, the OCC included two new provisions
to address these concerns. First, the new regulations "prohibit a
national bank from making any consumer loan - including any
form of mortgage loan, automobile loan, and student loan - that is
based predominately on the bank's expectation that it will be
repaid through foreclosure or liquidation of collateral that the
consumer used to secure the loan."37 Second, the new regulation
prohibits national banks from engaging in practices that are unfair
and deceptive under the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act in
connection with all types of lending.38 The OCC stated that
although the agency does not have the authority under the FTC
Act "to adopt rules defining particular acts or practices as unfair or
deceptive under that Act," it does have the authority to take
enforcement action where it finds unfair and deceptive practices.39
36. In Conference of State Bank Commissioners v. Conover, the D.C. Circuit
confirmed that §§ 93a and 371 authorize the OCC to issue regulations preempting
state law. 710 F.2d 878, 884-85 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
[Tihe entire legislative scheme is one that contemplates the
operation of state law only in the absence of federal law and where
state law does not conflict with the policies of the National
Banking Act. So long as he does not authorize activities that run
afoul of federal laws governing the activities of the national banks,
therefore, the Comptroller has the power to preempt inconsistent
state laws.
Id. at 885.
37. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Preemption Final
Rule Questions and Answers (Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/
2004-3dPreemptionQNAs.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2004) (emphasis in original).
38. Id.
39. Id. The OCC also asserted that it has been effectively addressing predatory
lending by reviewing bank lending activities under various Federal laws, including the
Homeowners Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA), the Fair Housing Act, and
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, as well as the FTC Act. Final Rule on
Preemption, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1913.
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C. Oversight hearings: "Congressional Review of OCC
Preemption," Jan. 28, 2004
Soon after the OCC finalized its preemption rules,
Chairwoman Sue Kelly (R-N.Y.) of the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Financial Service
Committee scheduled a hearing at which the OCC and its state
critics testified. The broad contours of the debate were
foreshadowed in the opening statements of Chairwoman Kelly and
full Committee Chairman Michael G. Oxley (R-Ohio). In her
statement, Rep. Kelly said that she had asked the OCC to defer
implementation of the rules pending Congressional review. She
stated:
[T]he OCC is tasked with interpreting
Congressional intent, and in terms of these
regulations, the intent of Congress is unclear....
This request presents the OCC with a tremendous
opportunity to display to Congress and consumers
that the agency takes this review seriously and is
willing to address concerns with the regulations.4"
Chairman Oxley disagreed, stating that "the OCC
regulations represent a thoughtful attempt to codify and
harmonize past legal precedents, and there are many, and
regulatory guidance into a coherent framework for resolving
conflicts between Federal and State laws as they apply to national
banks."4 He added:
40. Congressional Review of OCC Preemption Before the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations House Committee on Financial Services, 109th Congress
(Jan. 28, 2004) (statement of Chairwoman Sue Kelly at 1-2) available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/012804ke.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2004).
41. Congressional Review of OCC Preemption Before the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations House Committee on Financial Services, 109th Congress
(Jan. 28, 2004) (opening statement of Full Committee Chairmanm Michael G. Oxley
at 1) available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/012804ox.pdf (last
visited Feb. 13, 2004).
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Our dual system of national and State bank
chartering is a unique feature of the U.S. financial
marketplace, and has served the American economy
and American consumers well for almost 200 years.
Since the inception of the dual banking system,
tension has periodically flared between Federal and
State authorities over the proper allocation of
responsibility for overseeing the activities of
national banks. The regulations issued in final form
by the Comptroller earlier this month, after a period
for notice and comment, are the latest chapter in
that long-running debate. 42
1. OCC Testimony
First Senior Deputy Comptroller and Chief Counsel Julie
L. Williams explained the rationale for the OCC action:
As we explained in the preamble to the preemption
rule, markets for credit, deposits, and many other
financial products and services are now national, if
not international, in scope, as a result of significant
changes in the financial services marketplace,
particularly in the last 20 years. Now, more than
ever before, the imposition of an overlay of 50 State
and an indeterminate number of local standards and
requirements on top of the Federal requirements
and OCC supervisory standards to which national
banks already are subject has costly consequences
that materially affect a national bank's ability to
serve its customers.43
42. Id.
43. Congressional Review of OCC Preemption Before the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations House Committee on Financial Services, 109th Congress
(Jan. 28, 2004) (statement of the Honorable Julie L. Williams, First Senior Deputy
Comptroller and Chief Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency at 6)
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdfl12804jw.pdf (last visited
Feb. 13, 2004).
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She then addressed the implications for the dual banking
system:
Some critics have suggested that by codifying in
regulations the exclusivity of the OCC's supervision
of national banks and the types of State laws that
are, or are not, preempted as applied to national
banks, the OCC "will demolish" the dual banking
system, or "deprive bankers of a choice of charters."
Distinctions between State and Federal bank
charters, powers, supervision, and regulation are not
contrary to the dual banking system; they are the
essence of it.... It is important to remember that
the dual banking system offers American consumers
a choice-those who believe the State system offers
greater protections, or desirable variety, are free to
make that choice.'
3. The State Position
Expressing the state position on behalf of the CSBS was
Diana Taylor, New York Superintendent of Banks, who
characterized the OCC rules as a "kind of de facto 'field
preemption."'45 She asserted that when addressing preemption the
OCC should follow the "process of notice and consultation for the
preemption of state laws" embodied in Riegle-Neal.46 She urged
Congress to "intervene to reaffirm the balance of our dual banking
44. Id. at 15.
45. Congressional Review of OCC Preemption Before the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations House Committee on Financial Services, 109th Congress
(Jan. 28, 2004) (statement of the Ms. Diana L. Taylor, New York Superintendant of
Banking, on Behalf of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors at 11) available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/012804dt.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
Iowa Attorney General Thomas Miller also testified. See Congressional Review of
OCC Preemption Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations House
Committee on Financial Services, 109th Congress (Jan. 28, 2004) (statement of the
Honorable Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, State of Iowa on behalf of the
National Association of Attorneys General) available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/012804tm.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
46. Id. at 11.
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system and reject the OCC's drive to change our system of
regulation and applicable law so radically without any
Congressional input., 47 She summarized the state critique of the
OCC rules:
The traditional dynamic of the dual banking system
has been that the states experiment with new
products and services that Congress later enacts on
a nationwide basis. We generally discuss this history
in terms of expanded powers, but the states have
been innovators in the area of consumer protection,
as well. 48
The OCC is attempting to short-circuit this
dynamic with the sweeping de facto "field
preemption" of these recent regulations. States may
continue to seek new ways to protect their citizens,
but if the OCC's regulations were to be upheld,
these efforts would be ineffectual, because the laws
would not apply to the customers of most of the
nation's largest financial institutions who
increasingly control much of the nation's financial
assets.... If you lose the states as a laboratory for
consumer protections and other innovations you
lose a great attribute of our federalist system - the
ability to find out what does and doesn't work.49
This debate should not be about protecting or
advancing one charter over another. It should not
be about turf. It should be about creating the best
structure for a financial services system that allows a
wide range of financial institutions to compete
effectively and make their products and services
available to all segments of our nation, and that
offers consumers protection and remedies against
47. Id. at 5
48. Id. at 9.
49. Id. at 10.
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fraudulent and misleading practices - no matter the
charter of the consumers' financial institution. If
Congress finds that federal preemption is necessary
to achieve this goal, we will accept that. With his
actions, however, the Comptroller of the Currency
is trying to cut off this discussion altogether.5 °
Although this hearing, like the comment period on the
OCC rules, provided a forum for the OCC's critics, the statement
by Chairman Oxley signaled that he is not disposed to allow action
that would undo the OCC rule. The state furor is now being
channeled into litigation.51
III. INTERSTATE LENDING PARITY: MARQUETTE AND THE
SECTION 27 RESPONSE
The 1978 Marquette case dramatically demonstrated the
power of federal preemption by validating the ability of national
banks to "export" consumer credit interstate at uniform favorable
interest rates. That case signaled a fundamental change in the
"legal balance of power" in banking and the nationalization of the
marketplace for retail banking products. Congress quickly
recognized the destabilizing effect of Marquette on the dual
banking system and the need to provide parallel federal statutory
preemption for state banks as an essential means of preserving the
dual banking system.
50. Id. at 20.
51. See, e.g., Wachovia v. Burke, Civ. Action No. 3:03 CV 0738 (JCH) (Aug. 26,
2003); See also Todd Davenport, An Issue's Moment of Truth? A Complex History
and an Uncertain Future, AM. BANKER, Jan. 28, 2004, at 1 (quoting New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer as saying, "We will litigate [the OCC preemption
rule] if need be, but it is certainly an issue that has to be debated in the halls of
Congress").




A. Background: Providing Products and Services In the Bank's
Home State to Out-of-State Customers
Branching law has strictly regulated where a bank may
transact business (e.g. take deposits, make loans) and has limited
banking transactions to the bank's main or branch offices.53 For
banks, geographic location long has been an important legal
concept. Until the enactment of interstate branching in Riegle-
Neal I, all banks could transact such "core" banking business only
at authorized bank locations in the bank's home state.
A bank that has no interstate branches may issue credit
cards or provide other banking products by national advertising
and direct solicitation to customers in other states, through agents,
loan production offices, or other means not involving a branch
office. Decisions with respect to customer applications are made
in the bank's home state at its office, and, for example, the bank's
credit cards are issued in its home state. Customer payments are
made by mail to the bank in its home state, and payments to the
merchants at which the customer used its bank credit card are
disbursed from its home state. Moreover, under freedom of
contract principles a consumer residing outside of the bank's home
state is able to enter into an agreement with tle bank that
conforms to the law of the bank's home state (and applicable
federal law), rather than the law of the customer's state.
Under traditional contracts choice of law principles, this
structure supports the general view that all bank transactions take
place in the bank's home state under home state law. However,
choice of law principles also recognize that host state
constitutional or statutory provisions expressing a "vital state
interest" may be given effect even though a contractual
relationship involving a resident of that state was not established
there. Historically, state usury laws have been viewed as
embodying such a vital interest.
53. See e.g. 12 U.S.C. §§ 36, 1813(o), 1828(d) (2001). Indeed, since loans and
extensions of credit must be made only at an authorized main or branch office of an
insured bank, a state bank could not lawfully make an extension of credit "in"
another state except at such an office or branch. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(o) (2001)
(defining "domestic branch"), § 1828(d) (2001) (application requirement).
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Given these principles and charter limitations, state and
national banks for many decades have structured customer
relationships and transactions to take place at a main or home
state branch banking office. With the increase in the volume of
interstate delivery of financial services, the interpretation of the
NB Act § 85"4 in Marquette to preempt such state laws governing
interest rates was critical to the development of national consumer
credit markets. The immediate effect was to disadvantage state
banks.
B. The Marquette Case: National Bank Exportation of Interest
Rates under § 85 Preemption
The specific question in Marquette concerned the
"location" for § 8555 purposes of a national bank based in Omaha,
Nebraska, providing credit cards to Minnesota residents. In its
analysis the Court considered whether the manner in which the
lending bank conducted its business in the host state might mean
that the bank should be deemed to be "located" in that state. The
State of Minnesota argued that the Nebraska bank should be
deemed to be located in Minnesota because the bank
"systematically solicits Minnesota residents for credit cards to be
used in transactions with Minnesota merchants."
The facts stipulated in that case laid out plainly how the
Nebraska bank's business was structured to take place in that state
with limited contacts in Minnesota,56 and the Court determined
54. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2001).
55. Section 85 of the National Bank Act provides, in pertinent part:
Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan
or discount made ... interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the
State, Territory, or District where the bank is located, or at a rate
of 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day
commercial paper in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the
Federal reserve district where the bank is located, whichever may
be the greater, and no more, except that where by the laws of any
State a different rate is limited for banks organized under State
laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for associations organized
or existing in any such State under [title 62 of the Revised
Statutes].
12 U.S.C. § 85.
56. See Marquette, 439 U.S. at 312-13.
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that the locus of the banking transaction corresponded with the
designated charter location of the bank:
Omaha Bank cannot be deprived of this location
merely because it is extending credit to residents of
a foreign State. Minnesota residents were always
free to visit Nebraska and receive loans in that
State. It has not been suggested that Minnesota
usury laws would apply to such transactions.
Although the convenience of modern mail permits
Minnesota residents holding Omaha Bank's
BankAmericards to receive loans without visiting
Nebraska, credit on the use of their cards is
nevertheless similarly extended by Omaha Bank in
Nebraska by the bank's honoring of the sales drafts
of participating Minnesota merchants and banks.
Finance charges on the unpaid balances of
cardholders are assessed by the bank in Omaha,
Neb., and all payments on unpaid balances are
remitted to the bank in Omaha, Neb. Furthermore,
the bank issues its BankAmericards in Omaha,
Neb., after credit assessments made by the bank in
that city.
57
The Marquette Court's factual discussion construed the
term "located" in § 85 based on a contacts analysis. It took
seriously the Minnesota argument that the locus of the bank's
transactions could affect the location of the bank for § 85 purposes
and looked at the particular manner in which the bank did its
business to determine that the credit card transactions at issue
took place in Nebraska.58  The single fact that the location
designated in the bank's charter was Nebraska was not dispositive
of its "location" in this context. However, the Court clearly
recognized the nature of interstate banking business when it
57. Marquette, 439 U.S. at 310-12 (footnote omitted).
58. See Darrell L. Dreher, Hugh M. Hayden & Michael C. Tomkies,
Developments in the Interstate Delivery of Consumer Financial Services, 50 Bus. LAW.
1093, 1104-07 & nn.108-25 (1995).
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stated: "If the location of the bank were to depend on the
whereabouts of each credit card transaction, the meaning of the
term 'located' would be so stretched as to throw into confusion the
complex system of modern interstate banking.,59
The Marquette case resolved a question on which courts
had previously split6" by definitively determining that a national
bank was not subject to host state usury law. By permitting
national banks to lend interstate by exporting their home state
usury regime, Marquette confirmed the supremacy of § 85 over
state usury law outside the lender-national bank's home state. It
thus validated the ability of national banks to issue credit cards
and lend nationally without interstate branches from their home
state locations and created an obvious competitive imbalance
favoring national banks over states banks and thrifts.
C. Implications of Marquette
Beyond the particular construction of § 85, the discussion in
Marquette is a persuasive illustration of a contract choice of law
analysis supporting the broad conclusion that the bank in question
was not only "located" in its home state for § 85 purposes, but also
entered into its loan contracts and transacted its business there. In
order to export the interest rate, the bank must be able to enter
into a valid loan in its home state with a customer in another state.
Marquette thus implicitly validates the bank's ability to make the
loan and undercuts the ability of the host state to apply its law to
other aspects of the transaction. The Court did not say that the
lending bank in that case was located in Nebraska simply because
its charter designated that state as its legal place of business.
Rather, the Court determined that the bank was located where it
transacted its business.
59. Marquette, 439 U.S. at 312.
60. As summarized in the Marquette decision, the Minnesota trial court in that
case had held that the Nebraska bank's credit cards were subject to Minnesota usury
provisions, a result reached by the Iowa Supreme Court in a parallel case. Id. at 305,
307 n.17. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, on the
other hand, had held that the NB Act did preempt host state law. Id. at 306 & n.16.
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Marquette's significance goes beyond its holding, and the
case appears in many ways to have become the archetype for the
model that a bank may provide products to customers in other
states from its home state office and on the terms provided in its
charter law. The legislative history of Riegle-Neal specifically
reflects the general acceptance of the structure discussed in
Marquette in which banks can engage in multi-state business
through contracts legally made at its home state location under its
charter law.
Marquette gave important impetus to multi-state banking
by establishing firmly the principle under § 85 that a national bank
may "export" its home state usury regime to customers throughout
the country.
D. Federal Preemption for State Banks Under the Parity
Provision of§ 27
State-chartered banks had no specific statutory basis to
assert that they could similarly lend across state lines on a uniform
basis. Thus, state banks remained subject to the possibility that
host state usury law would apply when they issued credit cards or
otherwise extended credit to customers outside their home states.
To correct this disparity, two years after Marquette, § 27 of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA)61 was enacted as an
interstate usury statute for state banks' parallel to § 85.62 The § 27
61. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (2001).
62. § 27(a) of the FDIA substantively tracks § 85 of the NB Act and states:
In order to prevent discrimination against State-chartered insured
depository institutions, including insured savings banks, or insured
branches of foreign banks with respect to interest rates, if the
applicable rate prescribed in this subsection exceeds the rate such
State bank or insured branch of a foreign bank would be permitted
to charge in the absence of this subsection, such State bank or such
insured branch of a foreign bank may, notwithstanding any State
constitution or statute which is hereby preempted for the purposes
of this section, take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or
discount made, or upon any note, bill of exchange, or other
evidence of debt, interest at a rate of not more than 1 per centum
in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in
effect at the Federal Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve district
where such State bank or such insured branch of a foreign bank is
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statutory language was drafted to mimic § 85 so that the results for
state banks would match the operation of § 85 for national banks.
Congress used this drafting approach to ensure that parity for state
banks would result. In doing so, Congress implicitly affirmed the
analytical framework used by the Court in Marquette.
In Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts,63 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals confirmed this parity. The court held that § 27
of the FDIA and § 85 of the NB Act are to be construed in pari
materia because § 27 is patterned after § 85, their provisions
embody similar terms and concepts, and Congress clearly intended
to establish competitive equality between state-chartered lending
institutions and national banks with regard to interest rates by
enacting § 27. "Congress tried to level the playing field between
federally chartered and state chartered banks" when it enacted the
express federal preemption contained in § 27.' Subsequently, the
General Counsel of the FDIC issued an opinion to the same
effect.65
Section 27 restored balance to the dual banking system and
provided an express Congressional validation of a national policy
favoring uniform rules in interstate banking for both state and
national banks and that a preemptive federal regime can look to
state law, in this case, the law of the state where the national or
state bank is "located."
located or at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, territory, or
district where the bank is located, whichever may be greater.
12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a).
63. Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1052 (1993).
64. Greenwood, 971 F.2d at 826. In Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735
(1996), the Supreme Court subsequently addressed parallel substantive issues
concerning "interest" under the NB Act.
65. FDIC General Counsel's Opinion No. 10; Interest Charges Under Section 27
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 63 Fed. Reg. 19,258 (April 17, 1998).
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IV. PREEMPTION AND PARITY FOR STATE BANKS UNDER THE
RIEGLE-NEAL AcT, AS AMENDED
A. The Riegle-Neal Watershed
By the 1990s, a multi-state, even national, marketplace for
financial services was well established. Multi-state, multi-bank
bank holding companies were commonplace, as was direct delivery
of retail and wholesale banking products and services across state
lines. In this context, Riegle-Neal must be seen as fundamental
and historic on more than one level. Most obviously, it authorized
interstate brick-and-mortar branches. It thus reversed a
cornerstone provision of federal banking policy dating to the
Jackson Presidency over 150 years earlier. However, Riegle-Neal
means far more than additional brick-and-mortar locations.
In fashioning the legal framework for multi-state banks,
Congress had to consider the entire framework of rules governing
interstate banking. Indeed, once the rules regarding how and
where to effect interstate branching were largely agreed upon, an
extended discussion about "applicable law" took place among
Congressional leaders and staff, the Administration, banking
representatives, consumer/public interest groups, and state
governmental interests. Determining the state or federal law
applicable to interstate branches necessarily entailed consideration
of the law applicable to the bank as a whole because branches are
not distinct legal entities, but extensions of a single bank operating
under a single bank charter.
Taken as a whole, Riegle-Neal represents a new federal
framework governing multi-state banking, a confirmation that
banking was no longer a local activity, but a national activity in a
mobile, nationwide economy, in which funds are often obtained
and priced on national financial markets and credit extended to
customers on a multi-state basis. Riegle-Neal thus should not be
viewed as dealing only with interstate bricks-and-mortar, but as an
explicit federal policy for banking as a multi-state economic
activity conducted by state and national banks. For banks in the
post-Riegle-Neal world, federal preemption is a necessary
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corollary to interstate banking that allows a bank with interstate
branches to operate as a single integrated business unit.
B. The Three Distinct Components Of Riegle-Neal I
Riegle-Neal I dealt comprehensively with interstate
banking in a national context, including interstate bank
acquisitions, interstate branching, and the law applicable to
interstate institutions:
" It replaced the Douglas Amendment to the Bank
Holding Company (BHC) Act with a uniform federal
policy permitting interstate acquisition of banks by
BHCs without reference to state law;
66
" It established for the first time federal rules permitting
interstate branching for all insured banks (national and
state); it reversed national policy dating from the
Jackson era that the states should determine where
banks may establish branches;67 and
" The statute includes a federal preemption rule
determining the extent to which host state law might
apply to activities of both national and state banks with
interstate branches. For national banks, the statute
preserved intact the existing scope of preemption under
the NB Act so that national banks would continue to
operate both directly and through branches under the
uniform terms of the NB Act. Riegle-Neal I strictly
limited the instances in which state law might apply to a
national bank - that is, only four types of host state laws
could apply to interstate national bank branches and
then only to the extent they were not otherwise
preempted by the NB Act. Riegle-Neal I did not
provide parity for state banks: it determined as a matter
66. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (2001).
67. 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(g), 1828(d)(4)(A), 1831u(a)(4)(A), 1831u(g)(6) (2001).
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of federal law that host state law would generally apply
to state bank interstate branches.68
C. The Riegle-Neal "Applicable Law" Framework for National
Banks
Riegle-Neal I made national bank interstate branches
subject to host state law in four specified areas - consumer
protection, community reinvestment, fair lending and location of
intrastate branches (the so-called "Big Four") - unless the state
law in any of these four areas would be preempted by federal
law.69 Indeed, despite the surface deference to the "Big Four," this
provision in effect restates existing law: only state laws that are not
preempted apply to national banks. This provision thus has the
principal effect of designating which particular state law might
apply when the NB Act does not preempt.
The broad reach of the federal preemption "exception"
means that these ironically labeled "Big Four" host state
provisions have far less reach than it might seem on a first reading.
In reality, interstate branches of national banks are subject to the
NB Act to the same extent as home state branches are, and Riegle-
Neal I does not appear to have made national bank interstate
branches subject to host state laws to any greater extent than a
national bank based in that host state would be subject to that
state's law. Riegle-Neal I also plainly did not provide any basis for
a host state to assert that state law rather than the NB Act should
apply to the direct activities of a national bank in a host state.
1. Legislative History
The statement of Senator William Roth (R-Del.), a leading
architect of Riegle-Neal I, supports the view that the same law is to
apply throughout a bank (except to the extent that the "Big Four"
are not preempted and thus a non-preempted state law otherwise
provides):
68. Cf. 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (discussing the law applicable to interstate branching
operations to national bank branches).
69. See 12 U.S.C. § 36(f)(1)(A) (2001).
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[I]t is clear that the conferees intend that a bank in
State A that approves a loan, extends the credit, and
disburses the proceeds to a customer in State B, may
apply the law of State A even if the bank has a
branch or agent in State B and even if that branch
or agent performed some ministerial functions such
as providing credit card or loan applications or
receiving payments."7
Accordingly, for national banks, Riegle-Neal I provides
that the scope of federal preemption for national banks is the same
throughout a multi-state bank in all its direct activities with
customers in other states, and in both its home state and out-of-
state branches. The NB Act applies uniformly to the entire
national bank, and state law in the "Big Four" areas apply to both
home and host state branches according to location, but only if the
NB Act does not apply. Thus, although the Riegle-Neal language
is couched in terms of host state law applicable to out-of-state
branches, it states in substance a uniform national rule governing
national bank branches/activities wherever they take place.
The states understand this regime. Although the terms of
the post-1997 CSBS Nationwide Cooperative Agreement (the
"Agreement") are written to give apparent emphasis to the "Big
Four," the Agreement states that the same law applies to all
branches in host states, both state and national"1 :
Section 6.1. Host State Law.
Host state law that applies to the operations of a
branch established in the host state by an out-of-
state national bank, shall apply to the operations of
a host state branch of a multi-state bank, including:
70. 140 CONG. REC. S12785, S12789-790 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1994) (emphasis
added). In this statement, Sen. Roth refers broadly to the "law of State A," not just
State A's usury law. Id. (on file with the NCBI).
71. Conference of State Bank Supervisors Nationwide Cooperative Agreement
(1997), available at, http://www.csbs.org/government/agreements/pdf/nationwide-
coop-agrmnt.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
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(i) antitrust law and deposit concentration limits; (ii)
community reinvestment and similar laws; (iii)
consumer protection laws, including lending and
usury laws to the extent that laws or court decisions
regarding the exportation of interest rates are
inapplicable; and (iv) fair lending or equal credit
laws....
2. Significance of Riegle-Neal
For all banks, Riegle-Neal represents an express
Congressional re-assertion of its authority to regulate interstate
commerce engaged in by FDIC insured banks with state or
national charters. Riegle-Neal, including the 1997 Amendments,
represents a thorough Congressional policy with respect to
interstate banking and branching in this country that is grounded
in both the Commerce and Supremacy clauses of the U.S.
Constitution.
The detailed and comprehensive nature of the Riegle-Neal
framework with respect to interstate branching by all insured
banks supports the view that this legislation occupies the field with
respect to interstate banking and provides a uniform legal
framework applicable to state and national banks engaged in
interstate banking.72 We are not aware that any court to date has
been asked to view Riegle-Neal as preempting the field, but the
comprehensiveness of the Congressional consideration and final
statute support this view.
D. Applicable Law for State Banks Under Riegle-Neal I:
Disparity for State Banks
Riegle-Neal was not silent with respect to multi-state state
banks and did not leave it to the several states to determine how to
72. Cf Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Assn. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141
(1982) (holding that federal regulation may be so pervasive that one may reasonably
infer that Congress left no room for states to supplement it); Greenwood Trust Co.
v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 822-23 (1st. Cir. 1992) (discussing preemption
principles).
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treat state bank branches. Rather, it stated a federal rule that
incorporated the substantive law of each host state. As with the
earlier Douglas Amendment to the BHC Act, the choice to look to
the substance of state law does not make the statute any less a
federal rule. In 1994, as requested by the state banking regulators
represented by CSBS, Riegle-Neal I made host state law
applicable to out-of-state branches of state banks.73
CSBS took that position in 1994, even though a group of
major state banks argued that it would place state banks with
interstate branches at a substantial disadvantage vis-A-vis their
national bank competitors. In contrast to the efficiency of a multi-
state national bank operating almost entirely under the NB Act,
state banks would have to bear the burden and expense of
ensuring that their branches in host states conformed to each host
state's law across the board.
Once Riegle-Neal became law, state regulators realized
that the interstate disparity it created might seriously undermine
the state system and thus the dual banking system. Within two
years, CSBS reversed its position and began to seek parity in
interstate banking.
E. Riegle-Neal II - A New Federal Preemption Rule for State
Banks
After the legal barriers to interstate branching were
removed, CSBS recognized that a more seamless uniform state
system that paralleled the national system under Riegle-Neal
would be essential to the long-term vitality of the state banking
system in a multi-state or national environment. Parallel to the
development of its National Cooperative Agreement concerning
supervision of multi-state banks, CSBS took the lead in seeking
amendments to Riegle-Neal to provide the necessary legal parity
in a federal statute for state banks. The result was Riegle-Neal II,
a 1997 amendment to Riegle-Neal I that mimicked the Riegle-Neal
I "applicable law" language for national banks to provide a
73. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831ao) (2001).
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parallel federal preemption permitting state banks to operate
interstate under home state law.74
1. Legislative History
Riegle-Neal II was passed by the House, amended in the
Senate, and then passed as amended by the House. The legislative
history is sparse because there are no committee or conference
reports. Nevertheless, the purpose to provide state-national parity
is made plain by its sponsors, proponents, and opponents. The
only question is the scope of that parity.
74. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831a (2001). The language of the 1997 amendments directly
and intentionally mimics the original Riegle-Neal "applicable law" language for
national banks. As amended in 1997, the pertinent provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 1831a
are:
(j) ACTIVITIES OF BRANCHES OF OUT-OF-STATE BANKS
(1) APPLICATION OF HOST STATE LAW
The laws of a host State, including laws regarding
community reinvestment, consumer protection, fair
lending, and establishment of intrastate branches, shall
apply to any branch in the host State of an out-of-State
State bank to the same extent as such State laws apply to
a branch in the host State of an out-of State national
bank. To the extent host State law is inapplicable to a
branch of an out-of-State State bank in such host State
pursuant to the preceding sentence, home State law shall
apply to such branch.
(2) ACTIVITIES OF BRANCHES
An insured State bank that establishes a branch in a host
State may conduct any activity at such branch that is
permissible under the laws of the home State of such
bank, to the extent such activity is permissible either for a
bank chartered by the host State (subject to the
restrictions in this section) or for a branch in the host
State of an out-of-State national bank.
(3) SAVINGS PROVISION - No provision of this
subsection shall be construed as affecting the applicability
of -
(A) any State law of any home State under
subsection (b), (c), or (d) of [section 44 of the
FDIA]; or
(B) Federal law to State banks and State bank
branches in the home State or the host State.
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In the Senate, Banking Committee Chairman Alfonse
D'Amato (R-N.Y.) summarized the rationale for the bill as
follows:
[T]he trigger date for nationwide interstate
branching has passed-June 1, 1997. This important
legislation will preserve the benefits of the dual
banking system and keep the state banking charter
competitive in an interstate environment....
Mr. President, the dual banking system is under
attack. The bill is necessary to preserve confidence
in a state banking charter for banks with such a
charter that wish to operate in more than one state.
In addition, it will curtail incentives for unnecessary
Federal preemption of State laws. Finally, the bill
will restore balance to the dual banking system by
ensuring that neither charter operates at an unfair
advantage in this new interstate environment....
New York has more than 90 State[-]chartered
banks .... Without this legislation, the largest of
these institutions may be tempted to convert to a
national charter in order to operate in more than
one State....
The current law may be unclear as to whether
consistent rules are used to determine what laws and
powers apply to the out-of-state branches of state
and federally chartered banks .... [Summary of the
bill's terms omitted]
Enactment of H.R. 1306 also would bolster
efforts of New York and other states to make sure
that State[-]chartered banks have the powers they
need to compete efficiently and effectively in an
interstate environment.
Mr. President, this bill is especially important
now because of the efforts of the Comptroller of the
Currency to preempt state laws and promote the
national charter at the expense of the States and
other Federal regulators .... [T]he OCC has
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mounted an unprecedented, aggressive marketing
effort to convince State chartered banks to flip to a
national charter.75
When the bill was submitted for final passage, the lead
sponsor of Riegle-Neal II in the House, Rep. Marge Roukema (R-
N.J.), stated:
This bill had strong bipartisan support and clarifies
the ambiguities of the Riegle-Neal interstate bill and
preserves the dual banking system by allowing an
out-of-state branch of a state bank to offer the same
products allowed in its home state as long as the
host state banks or national bank branches... may
exercise those same powers.
In addition, the bill provides that the host state
law will apply to those out-of-State branches to the
extent it also applies to national banks .... [summary
of several amendments made in the Senate omitted]
H.R. 1306's intent is to provide parity between
national and State chartered banks in an interstate
environment as well as ensure the viability of the
dual banking system is unaffected by the Senate's
changes .... 76
2. Parity With National Banks Based on Home State Law
The 1997 Amendments changed the content of the original
Riegle-Neal framework and established a federal law basis for
state banks to operate host state branches based upon home state
law, with an overlay of federal regulation and supervision. Riegle-
Neal II established the model for state banks to achieve a
uniformity parallel to the NB Act. Specifically, the 1997
Amendments provide parity for state banks through a federal
statute that preempts state law under the Supremacy Clause the
75. 143 CONG. REC. S5,637, S5,637 (daily ed. June 12, 1997).
76. 143 CONG. REC. H4230 (daily ed. June 24, 1997).
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same as does any other federal statute. The amendments specify
that home state law will apply to interstate branches of state
banks, except that host state law will apply to state bank interstate
branches in the "Big Four" areas to the same extent as those host
state laws apply to national banks - that is, only to the extent such
state laws are not preempted for national banks.
The intended scope of Riegle-Neal II bears careful
consideration in the context of its legislative history. It clearly
provides parity treatment for interstate branches of a state bank.
But the Congressional leaders also recognized the broader effect
of OCC preemption on the dual banking system in the new era of
interstate banking. There is legislative history that may be read to
support the view that Riegle-Neal II provides a basis for federal
preemption potentially applicable to all the business and activities
of state banks. The argument in favor of this broader view has the
following elements:
Riegle-Neal II is specifically drafted to mimic the
Riegle-Neal national bank applicable law language that
was clearly intended to insure that the NB Act applied
uniformly to all the activities of a national bank both in
its home state and in other states, whether through
branch offices or direct dealing with out-of-state
customers. Riegle-Neal accepted the NB Act structure
as then understood and modified it only to provide an
express framework for the applicability of host state law
to a new feature of the national bank system, interstate
branch offices.
There is basis in the Riegle-Neal II legislative history
for an intention by Congress to support the dual
banking system in an interstate environment in which
national banks are supported by broad federal
preemption and to provide parity to state banks.
Moreover, in the Senate particularly there was concern
that the aggressive development of federal preemption
for national banks was further disadvantaging state
banks. Chairman D'Amato suggested that state bank
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parity would reduce the incentive for the OCC to be so
aggressive in promoting federal preemption.
To provide parity for state banks in a multistate
environment, Riegle-Neal as amended in 1997 may be
read as stating that both national and state banks can do
business across the country under their charter law (NB
Act and home state law, respectively) with the proviso
that business transacted at host state branches of both
national and out-of-state banks will be subject to host
state law only to the extent it survives the NB Act
preemption standard as provided in the "Big Four"
exception.
The 1997 Amendments thus may be read to provide the
same federal law basis for home state law to apply by its
terms to all transactions of a state bank. Under this
approach the home state law of a state bank should be
equally applicable as the NB Act is for national banks,
wherever they do business in the country (subject only
to the "Big Four" proviso in out-of-state branches).
The logic of this outcome is suggested by the following
example: Under Riegle-Neal II, if a Tennessee bank makes a loan
to a customer in Kentucky through its branch in Kentucky,
Tennessee law is unquestionably applicable to that loan. If the
same bank makes the same loan to the same Kentucky customer
from its home office in Tennessee (or through an operating
subsidiary), should Kentucky law apply? Or should Tennessee law
also apply, as when the loan is made through the branch in
Kentucky? Given the logic - and parity - of Tennessee law
applying in both instances and the legislative history concerning
the potentially adverse effects of national bank preemption on the
dual banking system, the use of language in Riegle-Neal II that
mimics the national bank "applicable law" provision might support
a determination (by the FDIC, for example) that the full parity
suggested by this example may be implied from the enactment of
Riegle-Neal II.
2004]
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3. National Banking Policy in Riegle-Neal I and II
Riegle-Neal, as amended, may be seen as establishing a
federal banking law/regulatory framework to correspond to a
nationwide banking marketplace. Parallel to § 27, Riegle-Neal II
provided a federal basis for a state bank with interstate branches
to "export" its home state law and operate under a uniform
multistate regime. Given Congressional understanding of bank
needs in today's marketplace and the scope of possible federal
preemption of national banks, it may be possible to view Riegle-
Neal as embodying a general federal policy that the law of a bank's
state or national charter authority should govern all its activities
wherever conducted in this country, subject to the limited, express
"Big Four" exception justified by the presence of a branch in a
host state and applicable only in such a host state, and then only to
the extent to which that law is not preempted under the NB Act.
The limited scope of these exceptions thus reinforces the
conclusion that Congress recognized that bank branches are not
legally distinct entities, but additional physical locations that
operate under the same charter as the rest of the bank, and that
Congress correspondingly endorsed a general policy that all banks
are to be generally subject to one body of banking law wherever
they do business across the country.
F. A Note About Marquette/Section 27 in Light of Riegle-Neal
Conceptually, the Riegle-Neal preemption is broad enough
to subsume the existing § 85 and § 27 usury preemption regime.
Nevertheless, Congress determined to preserve and recodify the
Marquette usury regime explicitly.
The retention of the pre-Riegle-Neal Marquette framework
parallel to the new interstate regime is supported by Riegle-Neal
and its legislative history. Proponents of interstate branching also
wanted to ensure that Riegle-Neal would in no way undermine
home state interest charge exportation under § 85 and § 27. To
this end, § 111(3) of Riegle-Neal expressly affirmed Marquette by
stating that nothing in the new act shall be construed as affecting
the applicability of § 85 or § 27. The explanation of this provision
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by its chief proponent goes beyond the specific issue of
exportation of interest charges to clarify the home state
exportation model itself." Accordingly, if a transaction is
structured to take place at a home state office, the legal location of
the transaction will not be changed by the fact that the bank may
operate a branch in the (host) state where the customer resides.
According to Sen. Roth, the export regime codified by
Riegle-Neal does not rest on simple exportation of home state
usury law, but incorporates a functional approach based upon
where the loan is made. The locus is effectively determined by
where three "nonministerial" functions take place: where the
credit decision is made, where the extension of the credit takes
place, and where the loan funds are disbursed. Accordingly, if a
loan is made in the home state, home state law governs (regardless
of where the customer resides or whether certain "ministerial"
activities have occurred in the host state); and, if the loan is made
in a branch in the host state, then host state law applies. This
framework has been recognized and implemented by the banking
agencies interpreting Riegle-Neal.78
The difference between § 851Marquettel§ 27 and the
general approach to federal preemption is reflected in federal
banking regulations, which treat the interest charge preemption
issues raised by those provisions distinct from the broader range of
preemption questions. The Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)
regulations include specific provisions addressing interstate
interest charges but take the position that virtually all other
questions concerning interstate lending are dealt with under
general preemption principles.79
77. See 140 CONG. REC. S12,785, S12789-790 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1994).
78. See FDIC General Counsel's Opinion No. 11, Interest Charges by Interstate
State Banks, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,282 (May 18, 1998).
79. Compare 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001 (addressing interest charges under § 85), with
§ 7.4002 (non-interest charges are addressed under preemption principles), and 12
C.F.R. § 560.2 ("applicability of law" - preemption - in general), with § 560.110
(most favored lender usury preemption).
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V. PREEMPTION FOR DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR
FINANCIAL AFFILIATES UNDER § 104 OF THE GLBA
Congress provided further express federal preemption in
support of a national financial services marketplace in the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) in 1999. Section 104 of this legislation
provides express federal preemption for an unprecedented range
of beneficiaries: not only all federally insured banks and thrifts,
but also all "financial" subsidiaries and affiliates of insured
depository institutions. Under § 104, any state law that is
discriminatory or burdensome (as defined) for any such entity is
preempted."0  As discussed below, § 104 also has specific
application in support of interstate parity for state banks.
A. Background
Section 104 arose out of concern with the laws of many
states that sought to prevent or burden bank-insurance affiliations.
Many of the detailed and complex provisions of § 104 reflect the
lengthy and difficult negotiations among bank and insurance
groups to fashion acceptable language. Section 104 resolved
longstanding differences between banking and insurance interests
and was a political linchpin of GLBA. After this treaty was
worked out to preempt protectionist state insurance provisions,
additional parallel language was added to provide similar
protection to financial organizations with respect to state
provisions that adversely affect the terms of competition for all
banks and their financial subsidiaries and affiliates.
The reports of both the Senate Banking Committee and
House Commerce Committee, the committees that had the
primary roles in drafting § 104, make plain their intent to ensure
that state laws would not stand in the way of continued
development of a nationwide "level playing field" in the financial
services marketplace. The Senate Banking Committee took the
lead role in fashioning § 104 in the form ultimately enacted and
expressly addressed its purpose in its Report:
80. 15 U.S.C. § 6701(e) (2001).
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[T]he Committee is aware that some States have used
their regulatory authority to discriminate against
insured depository institutions, their subsidiaries and
affiliates. The Committee has no desire to have State
regulation prevent or otherwise frustrate the affiliations
and activities authorized or permitted by this bill. Thus,
§ 104 clarifies the application of State law to the
affiliations and activities authorized or permitted by the
bill (or other Federal law), and ensures that applicable
State law cannot prevent, discriminate against, or
otherwise frustrate such affiliations or activities."
The House Commerce Committee specifically focused on
the language concerning non-insurance financial affiliations. Its
Report states:
The purpose of .... [the Act] is to establish a
comprehensive framework to permit affiliations
among securities firms, insurance companies, and
commercial banks. The primary objective of
allowing such affiliations is to enhance consumer
choice in the financial services marketplace,
eliminate anti-competitive regulatory disparities
among financial services providers, and increase
competition among providers of financial services.82
For banks, the starting point in their negotiation was the
preemption analysis followed by the U.S. Supreme Court in a series
of cases over many decades, most recently Barnett Bank v. Nelson in
1996."3 That case stated that a state law would be preempted by the
NB Act if it impeded, prevented, or significantly interfered with the
conduct of activities permitted to national banks, in this case small-
town insurance agency activities.
81. S. REP. No. 106-44, at 11 (April 28, 1999) (Senate Banking Committee).
82. H.R. REP. No. 106-74, pt. 3, at 98 (June 15, 1999); Accord, S. REP. No. 106-
44, at 4-6 (April 28, 1999) (Senate Banking Committee); H.R. REP. No. 106-74, pt. 1,
at 97 (March 23, 1999) (House Banking Committee).
83. Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
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B. Provisions of § 104
Subsections 104(a) and (b) simply restate the continued
force of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the requirement that all
persons engaged in the "business of insurance" in a state must be
licensed as provided by that state's law.84 Subsection 104(c)
provides for federal preemption to ensure the ability of depository
institutions to establish affiliations or associations with insurance
firms, while maintaining the ability of state insurance regulators to
review new insurance affiliations on a nondiscriminatory basis.
Subsections 104(d) and (e) are the heart of the section's
preemption framework. These provisions are relatively complex
and must be read together. Finally, under Subsection 104(f) state
law concerning corporate governance, antitrust, and securities
registration and antifraud enforcement are expressly protected
from preemption under § 104.
1. Financial Activities
At the threshold, § 104(d)(1) states a broad federal
preemption rule covering all activities of a depository institution
and its financial affiliates. It reaches any state law or action that
would "prevent or restrict" an insured depository institution, or
affiliate thereof, from "engaging directly or indirectly, either by
itself or in conjunction with an affiliate, or any other person" in
any financial activity. State law or actions concerning activities
other than insurance are also made subject to a four-part
nondiscrimination test in paragraph (d)(4).85
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 6701(a)(b) (2001).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(4) states, in pertinent part:
No State statute, regulation, order, interpretation, or other action
shall be preempted under paragraph (1) to the extent that-
(A) it does not relate to, and is not issued and adopted, or enacted for
the purpose of regulating, directly or indirectly, insurance sales,
solicitations, or cross marketing activities covered under paragraph (2);
(B) it does not relate to, and is not issued and adopted, or enacted
for the purpose of regulating, directly or indirectly, the business of
insurance activities other than sales, solicitations, or cross
marketing activities, covered under paragraph (3);
(C) it does not relate to securities investigations or enforcement
actions referred to in subsection (f); and
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2. Insurance
Insurance sales activities are governed by § 104(d)(2).86
State rules or actions concerning insurance sales, solicitation, or
cross-marketing are subject to the detailed, and often ambiguous,
provisions of this section. Paragraph (d)(2) provisions governing
such state insurance sales activities are especially complicated:
they include a multi-part general rule and two significant
exceptions. The general rule subjects state legislation affecting
insurance sales activities to several tests: a "prevent or significantly
restrict" test "in accordance with" Barnett, and four
"nondiscrimination"87 tests. It further provides that disputes
between banking and insurance regulators are litigated under
special procedures set forth in GLBA § 304 subject to a "without
unequal deference" standard of review.
In response to insurance group concerns that the four new
"nondiscrimination" tests in subsection (e) would invalidate
existing laws that (they believed) could survive scrutiny under the
Barnett case standards, certain specific exceptions were included in
(D) it-
(i) does not distinguish by its terms between depository
institutions, and affiliates thereof, engaged in the activity
at issue and other persons engaged in the same activity in
a manner that is in any way adverse with respect to the
conduct of the activity by any such depository institution
or affiliate engaged in the activity at issue;
(ii) as interpreted or applied, does not have, and will not
have, an impact on depository institutions, or affiliates
thereof, engaged in the activity at issue, or any person
who has an association with any such depository
institution or affiliate, that is substantially more adverse
than its impact on other persons engaged in the same
activity that are not depository institutions or affiliates
thereof, or persons who do not have an association with
any such depository institution or affiliate;
(iii) does not effectively prevent a depository institution
or affiliate thereof from engaging in activities authorized
or permitted by this Act or any other provision of Federal
law; and
(iv) does not conflict with the intent of this Act generally
to permit affiliations that are authorized or permitted by
Federal law.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2) (2001 & Supp. 2003).
87. See § 6701(e).
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the final rule. Under the compromise, "Old Law" (statutes, rules,
or actions in force on September 3, 1998) is made subject only to
the "prevent or significantly restrict" test and not the
"nondiscrimination" tests. However, a proviso exists. In cases
involving Old Law, the courts would continue to accord deference
to the federal banking agencies under the Barnett and Chevron
cases. A second, so-called "safe harbor" exception covered
thirteen specified types of state rules that are protected from
preemption under the general rule as long as they conform to
detailed federal standards set forth in § 104 (d)(2)(B). Under
paragraph (d)(3), nonsales insurance activities (e.g., chartering and
regulation of insurance underwriters and licensing and general
regulation of agents and brokers) are subjected to a set of broad
"nondiscrimination" tests under subsection (e).
C. Preemption Under GLBA § 104 for the Benefit of State
Banks
Although the original impulse behind § 104 arose from
state insurance laws designed to prevent banks from having
insurance affiliates, its language as finally enacted reaches
potentially any state law barring or interfering with the provision
of financial services in that state by any bank or any financial
affiliate of a bank. Indeed, § 104 may be viewed as a further
express statement of a national policy to establish a national,
competitive marketplace for banking and financial services and to
prevent state law from favoring some competitors over others.
This section is very broadly worded and its language can be read
comfortably to address and thus preempt burdensome or
discriminatory state laws as applied to state banks and their
affiliates. This result is supported by the language of § 104 and
should not be undercut by the lack of evidence that the drafters of
§ 104 specifically contemplated its application to host state laws
that disadvantage or place greater requirements on out-of-state
banks compared to in-state banks or national banks.
The literal terms of § 104(d)(1) state a federal preemption
rule covering all banking and financial activities of a depository
institution and its affiliates. It reaches any state law or action that
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would "prevent or restrict a[n] [insured] depository institution, or
affiliate thereof, from "engaging directly or indirectly, either by
itself or in conjunction with an affiliate, or any other person" in
any financial activity.88 The broad (d)(1) "prevent or restrict" rule
is given further gloss in paragraph (d)(4), which subjects state law
or actions concerning activities other than insurance to four
separate nondiscrimination tests. Under these provisions, no state
may regulate noninsurance financial activities as permitted under
GLBA or "any other provision of Federal law" of insured
depository institutions or affiliates thereof to the extent that such
rule or action:
(i) "distinguishes by its terms" between depository
institutions or affiliated entities and other persons
or entities engaged in a financial activity "in a
manner that is in any way adverse" with respect to
the conduct of the activity by a depository
institution or affiliated entity;8 9
(ii) "as interpreted or applied, has or will have an
impact on depository institutions" and affiliated
entities that is "substantially more adverse than its
impact on other persons" or entities (that are not a
depository institution or affiliated entity) engaged in
the same activity;90
(iii) "effectively prevents" such a depository
institution or affiliated entity from engaging in any
activity permitted by GLBA or any other provision
of federal law;9' or
(iv) "conflicts with the intent" of GLBA and the
amendments made by GLBA to allow affiliations
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These tests are cumulative, and thus a state law, rule, or
any other state "action" that runs afoul of any one of these tests is
subject to preemption. The tests in subparagraph (i) and (iii)
particularly might be applied to interstate banking activities.
Subparagraph (i) is a parity provision that addresses state law that
"by its terms" deals differently and in an adverse way with two
distinguishable groups of persons engaging in the same activity.
This provision expressly reaches state law provisions that
distinguish between "depository institutions.., engaged in the
activity at issue" and "other persons engaged in the same activity."
The question from an out-of-state state bank's perspective is
whether "other persons" may be read to include another class of
depository institutions, and thus whether this provision would
preempt, for example, a state statute that imposes requirements or
restrictions on out-of-state state banks, but not on in-state banks
or federally chartered banks or thrifts.
First, there is no language in subparagraph (i), nor anything
in the structure of subparagraph (i), to narrow the breadth of
"persons" to exclude depository institutions. Further, there is
evidence in the next subparagraph supporting the view that these
provisions were carefully drawn and that when Congress wished to
distinguish between depository institutions and non-depository
institutions, it could do so. In subparagraph (ii), states are barred
from having laws that have "an impact on depository institutions
...that is substantially more adverse than its impact on other
persons... engaged in the same activities that are not depository
,,93institutions...
Subparagraph (i) thus focuses on state laws or other actions
that on their face distinguish between a class that includes a
depository institution or affiliate and any other class of persons in
a way that is "in any way adverse" to the conduct of any activity by
a depository institution or affiliate. Subparagraph (ii) contains a
"substantially adverse impact" test applicable to laws that affect
depository institutions or their affiliates differently from non-
depository entities. Congress thus chose to cast a wider net for
state laws or actions involving facial discrimination than for ones
93. 15 U.S.C. §6701(e)(2) (emphasis added).
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that are facially neutral but would have an adverse effect only on a
depository institution or an affiliate.
Accordingly, subparagraph (i) should apply to a host state
that enacts a statute that places burdens on out-of-state banks that
it does not place on other persons, e.g., in-state state banks or
federally chartered institutions wherever located. For example,
this provision would appear to preempt a host state rule or action
that would require a state depository institution from another state
to receive a license or set up an approved office in the host state
before it can provide lending products and services in the host
state, but does not seek to apply such requirements to out-of-state
federal thrifts or banks. There is the further issue of whether a
state statute that purports to reach all federal and state depository
institutions but is preempted by the NB Act and HOLA for
federal institutions should be preempted under § 104 provisions
with respect to state banks (both in-state and out-of-state)
because, as construed by the courts, its terms distinguish between
federal and state institutions.
Subparagraph (iii) addresses barriers, not discrimination.
A state law, other state requirement, or "action" thus may be
preempted if it serves as a barrier to entry by a depository
institution or affiliate chartered and supervised by another state,
and thus an entity that presumptively satisfies legitimate host state
regulatory qualifications.
Section 104 has a broad, but largely unexplored sweep. Its
stated purpose is not just to remove state barriers to bank
insurance activities, but also to overcome state laws, rules, or
"actions" that put one type of competitor in financial services -
including state banks and their subsidiaries - at a disadvantage
vis-A-vis other competitors. This provision seems particularly
suited to addressing questions related to state laws that impose
requirements on the activities of out-of-state banks and their
operating subsidiaries that are not imposed on either in-state
depository institutions or national banks and their subsidiaries.
20041
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VI. A CONSTITUTIONAL TOOL: THE "NEGATIVE" COMMERCE
CLAUSE
It is well established that "the Commerce Clause is more
than an affirmative grant of power; it has a negative sweep as well.
The Clause, in Justice Stone's phrasing, 'by its own force,'
prohibits certain state actions that interfere with interstate
commerce." 94 The Supreme Court has held that this "negative"
commerce clause authority prevents a state from denying entry to
an out-of-state financial company.95 It also should limit the ability
of a state to burden or interfere with the activities of a state bank
in another state, although cases so holding are rare. 6 In keeping
with cases holding that the negative commerce clause bars a state
from imposing any tax on an out-of-state company soliciting and
providing products to host state customers solely through the mails
or other common carriers, a state should be barred from imposing
burdens or requirements on direct sales and service activities by an
out-of-state bank that has no office or presence in that state and
that deals with customers only by means of the mails, telephone or
other common carriers.97
Such a Commerce Clause argument was made in the brief
submitted by the American Bankers Association in a 2002
preemption case (ABA Brief). That suit challenged a California
statute imposing significant disclosure and consumer education
94. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992). The authors wish to
thank George Sutton of Callister Nebeker & McCullough for calling this case to our
attention and for his thoughtful comments on these issues.
95. See generally Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980)
(finding state protectionism in this practice).
96. See generally Carver v. Myers, 75 Dauph. 129 (Pa. Cty. 1960) (finding undue
state burden on interstate commerce).
97. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 311:
[W]e will sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge so
long as the "tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related
to the services provided by the State."]
[The Court reaffirmed an earlier case that] stands for the
proposition that a vendor whose only contacts with the taxing
State are by mail or common carrier lacks the "substantial nexus"
required by the Commerce Clause.
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requirements on issuers of credit card products that have very low
minimum monthly payments, with the result that customers
making only that minimum payment carry credit card debt over
extended periods of time. The ABA brief discussed in detail the
burdens, in terms of costs and additional service systems, that the
California law imposed on out-of-state banks that provide credit
cards in California.98 This ABA brief was filed in addition to the
principal briefs filed by the plaintiff banking associations and
banks arguing that the California statute was preempted for
federal banks and thrifts under the National Bank Act and the
Home Owners Loan Act. The court held that the statute was
preempted under these federal laws and granted injunctive relief
to the federally chartered parties. The court's initial ruling did not
address the Commerce Clause argument on behalf of state banks.99
Soon after that ruling, the court issued an order granting the same
injunctive relief to state banks, pending appeal, with the
concurrence of the state Attorney General. This order tersely
stated that the claim asserted under the Commerce Clause was
moot. °
The result in the Lockyer case indicates that state banks
can receive indirect benefits from federal preemption by
piggybacking on a holding in favor of federal institutions. The
court's unwillingness to rule on the merits of the Commerce
Clause argument may have reflected a reluctance to open the door
to Constitutional claims in the context of a consumer protection
statute in banking. Despite this reluctance, the "negative"
Commerce Clause remains a legal tool available to state banks
operating in interstate markets.
98. See Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Plaintiffs' Application for Preliminary Injunction, American Bankers Ass'n. v.
Lockyer, (E.D. Cal. filed Nov. 8, 2002) (CIV. S-02-1138 FCD (JFM)) ("Negative
commerce clause" analysis) (on file with NCBI). This brief did not attempt to argue
that Riegle-Neal and § 104 might also support parity for state banks. See id.
99. See Memorandum of Points Order, American Bankers Ass'n. v. Lockyer,
(E.D. Cal. filed Dec. 23, 2002) (CIV. S-02-1138 FCD (JFM)) (order granting
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VII. STATE APPROACHES
The focus of states is naturally within their borders, with
respect to both the integrity of state laws and institutions in the
federal system and the terms of competition in banking within the
state. The perception that the recent OCC preemption actions
represent a significant new restriction on the ability of state
authorities to enforce laws within their borders is fueling the
current preemption controversy.
Federal preemption and the ability of the OCC to expand
the activities of national banks of course have long been sensitive
issues at the state level, and states have reacted in a variety of
ways. With respect to powers, a number of states enacted so-
called "wild card" statutes to provide a mechanism for state banks
to exercise powers permitted to national banks that were not
expressly authorized in state law. The response of state banking
officials to the enactment of Riegle-Neal I is a further and more
significant example of innovation in the dual banking system.
After initially seeking to retain each state's jurisdiction over out-
of-state institutions in Riegle-Neal I, state bank officials and CSBS
realized that the strength of the state system as a whole required
each state to give up in practice "host state" authority by allowing
each home state banking department to be the primary regulator,
supervisor and examiner of the interstate state banks operating
under its charter. Through their cooperative agreements and
advocacy of Riegle-Neal II, the state bank regulators have
embraced the home state export model as the means to develop a
state system that substantially parallels and is a genuine alternative
to the national system.
A. State Wild Card Statutes
In an era in which the activities of national banks and
federal thrifts are permitted to engage in steadily, if incrementally,
has expanded through federal regulation and agency
interpretation, the states have enacted general parity statutes that
allow for parallel expansion of state bank activities without the
need for specific legislative action (although specific regulating
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action is often required). These so-called "wild card" statutes vary
in their specifics, but generally provide for state banks to be able
to match national bank, and in some cases federal thrift, activities.
Although these statutes are directed at intrastate competitive
parity with national banks, it is possible that in combination with
§ 104 and in light of the CSBS cooperative agreements, a state wild
card statute might be interpreted to allow an out-of-state bank to
operate under a home state law that parallels the host state law
rather than be required to comply with host state law.
B. CSBS Initiatives
1. CSBS Innovative Approach
In recent years, the state banking regulators, under the
leadership of the CSBS, have charted a course that gives the
primary regulatory role to each home state banking department
over the activities of its state banks, including their branches and
trust activities in host states. This framework, however, has not
been extended to include state bank operating subsidiaries. State
banking regulators now generally appreciate the importance of
minimizing, if not eliminating, state-by-state regulatory burdens
and barriers so that a state banking charter will be attractive.
These regulators have taken the unusual step of effectively curbing
their jurisdiction as host state regulators to enhance the state
system as a whole.
State banking regulators acting collectively through CSBS
and individual states have taken actions to provide a parallel legal
framework and policies that recognize the need for state banks in
practical terms to be able to operate with parity vis-A-vis federal
institutions. In the wake of Riegle-Neal I, CSBS took the lead in
the enactment of the 1997 Amendments to the Riegle-Neal Act
and supported federal parity.
At the same time, the state bank regulators through CSBS
adopted a multi-state agreement concerning the supervision and
examination of multi-state state banks which recognizes the "first-
2004]
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among-equals" role of the home state banking department. 1 '
State bank regulators recognize the need for multi-state
cooperation so that state banks will be able to operate efficiently,
seamlessly, and without undue regulatory burden on a multi-state
basis.0 2  However, state attorneys-general and other state
departments have not been party to these agreements and are
more likely to continue to enforce state laws under their
jurisdiction by their terms.
2. Post-Riegle-Neal Cooperative Agreement
The Agreement concerns the operation and supervision of
multi-state state banks and has been agreed to by all of the
individual state banking departments. Through that agreement,
CSBS sought to ensure the competitiveness of state banks in the
interstate banking/branching environment by establishing the
primacy of home state law in all instances in which the NB Act
applies for national banks.0 3 Home state law will be applied in all
areas in which state law is pre-empted by the NB Act, including
with respect to the "Big Four" - consumer protection, CRA, fair
lending, and intrastate branching. 4  The adoption of this
101. CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, Nationwide Cooperative
Agreement (1997), available at, http://www.csbs.org/government/agreements/
pdf/nationwide-coop-agrmnt.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2004) (on file with NCBI).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Section 6 of the Agreement states:
The parties recognize that neither home nor host state supervisors
may be empowered to waive provisions of home or host state law
directly applicable to multi-state banks or their branches in host
states. To the extent it may assist counsel and judicial authorities in
resolving issues of applicable law, however, the parties agree that
those issues may be resolved using the following general principles.
Section 6.1. Host State Law.
Host state law that applies to the operations of a branch
established in the host state by an out-of-state national bank, shall
apply to the operations of a host state branch of a multi-state
bank, including: (i) antitrust law and deposit concentration limits;
(ii) community reinvestment and similar laws; (iii) consumer
protection laws, including lending and usury laws to the extent that
laws or court decisions regarding the exportation of interest rates
are inapplicable; and (iv) fair lending or equal credit laws. ...
FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Agreement and the acceptance of the role of home state law and
supervisors as the primary point of contact for interstate banking
activities should substantially reduce, but probably not eliminate,
the risk that a state bank regulator would seek to apply a host
state law to a state bank that would not apply to a national bank.
And, of course, in a particular case a state supervisor may take a
narrower view of the scope of national bank preemption than the
OCC.
3. Trust Agreement
CSBS in recent years has been expanding its multi-state
programs into trust activities (an area in which historically each
state's law was regarded as broadly applicable to all providers,
federal and state), again in response to OTS and OCC initiatives
to provide an interstate trust regime based on federal law. CSBS
seeks to ensure that state trust companies will be able to provide
trust products and services from a home state platform on a multi-
state basis. A Multi-State Trust Cooperative Agreement has now
been agreed to by almost all the state bank regulators. °5 This
Agreement and related procedures provide for the home state
banking department to play a leading, pro-active role with other
state departments to address and resolve host state legal and
compliance matters.
Section 6.2. Home State Law.
To the extent that, based on the principles referred to in Section
6.1, host state law is determined to be inapplicable to particular
operations of a host state branch of a multi-state bank, such
operations shall be governed by home state law. In addition, home
state law shall apply generally to the corporate structure and
procedures and internal policies of a multi-state bank including: (i)
charter and bylaws; (ii) incorporation and dissolution; (iii) board of
directors and management; (iv) capital; (v) loans and investments;
(vi) common trust funds; (vii) dividends; (viii) indemnification of
directors and officers; (ix) stock and debt; and (x) structure of
bank subsidiaries.
CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, Nationwide Cooperative Agreement,
supra note 101.
105. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, Nationwide Agreement for
Supervision and Examination of Multi-State Trust Operations, available at,
http://www.csbs.org/government/agreements/html/nationwide-agrmnt-multi-
statetrust-op.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2004) (on file with NCBI).
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4. CSBS Profile
In addition, in its Profile of State Banking (the "Profile")
compendium, CSBS staff has been promoting practical uniformity
by surveying state banking departments to determine the nature
and scope of each state's law, as applied, on a wide - and
expanding - range of topics, such as branching, nonbanking
activities, trust activities, etc. The Profile is intended to encourage
greater substantive uniformity and be a snapshot resource for
identifying particular state laws that may raise issues for multi-
state providers.
5. A Work in Progress
As impressive as these developments are, they are quite
recent and thus have not had time to produce a nationwide system
without potential gaps for state banks. Moreover, CSBS has not
undertaken to extend this framework to state bank operating
subsidiaries. Together with the state and federal law discussed
above, the CSBS system provides state regulators necessary tools
for fostering a seamless multi-state system. It is particularly
important that CSBS and its member banking commissioners have
agreed that a bank's home state banking regulator should take the
lead vis-A-vis other state regulators and be directly involved in the
development of an appropriate and competitive multi-state
compliance arrangement that is workable.
6. 2003 Initiative by CSBS to Amend § 105 of Riegle-Neal
Targeted federal amendments are also part of the CSBS
agenda. In 2003, in response to a proposal by the Texas Banking
Department to adopt a state rule providing for assessment and
examination of out-of-state branches, CSBS proposed an
amendment to § 105 of Riegle-Neal to enhance home state bank
regulatory authority over multi-state state banks. This proposal
was adopted as section 619 of H.R. 1375, the Financial Services
Regulatory Relief Act of 2003, at the mark-up by the full House
[Vol. 8
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Financial Services Committee on May 20, 2003.106 That bill has yet
to be reported to the House floor.
The original Riegle-Neal Act gave host states authority
over state bank interstate branches in those states. § 105 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1820(h)) provides the host state regulator with
authority to examine host state branches for compliance with host
state banking, consumer protection, fair lending, and community
reinvestment laws, and laws governing permissible activities. The
host state also may examine to ensure that branch activities in the
host state are conducted in a safe and sound manner. It is silent
with respect to the ability of a host state to levy fees on branches
of out-of-state banks. This provision allows enforcement actions
by the host state banking agency (or other host state authorities)
for violation of applicable host state law.
The amendment proposed in 2003 is intended to conform
§ 105 to Riegle-Neal II. It states the general rule that the home
state regulator is the overall regulator, supervisor, and examiner of
state banks, including their host state branches. It also states that
state bank regulators will act in accordance with the terms of
cooperative agreements and thus gives statutory force to the
Cooperative Agreement entered into by the state banking
department. It also expressly states that only a home state may
levy fees or assessments, unless otherwise specifically provided by
cooperative agreement.
With respect to examination, the amendment retains the
ability of host states to examine for compliance with host state
consumer protection, fair lending or community reinvestment
provisions to the extent they are applicable under the Riegle-Neal
II parity provisions. A host state would have safety-and-soundness
examination authority over host state branches only if the bank
were determined to be in a "troubled condition" (CAMELS 4 or
5). A host state must provide notice to the home state before
initiating any examination and all examinations must be conducted
106. Section 619 of the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2003, H.R.
1375 (May, 20, 2003), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/
pdfl108fchrl375amla.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2004) (on file with NCBI). Section 401
of the bill also includes amendments to facilitate interstate trust activities by state
institutions.
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in accordance with a cooperative agreement. A host state would
be able to initiate an enforcement action for violation of a host
state consumer protection, fair lending, or community
reinvestment law if it is applicable to the state bank branch under
Riegle-Neal II.
This amendment is an example of the incremental steps
that can be taken to provide a state banking system that parallels
the national bank system, with the chartering agency, the home
state banking department, in a functionally parallel position to the
OCC. Although this proposal gives a greater role to host states
than is the case for national banks, it would provide substantial
parity for state banks operating on an interstate basis.
7. Limits Flowing from Jurisdiction of Other State Agencies
In most states, agencies of state government other than the
banking department (including the Attorney General) have
jurisdiction over financial activities, such as lending activities
conducted by all providers except as expressly excluded. While
there are often express exceptions for home-state banks, national
banks, and perhaps federal thrifts, the list of exceptions rarely
includes insured banks chartered by other states, even though such
banks are subject to the same federal rules and a parallel state
regime in their home states. In contrast to contemporary banking
departments, these other state agencies still tend to think in terms
of their single state jurisdiction, not of a cooperative state system.
For bank activities, one or more parts of the legal
framework should support a conclusion in favor of applying home-
state law so that there is federal parity, in which a host state
agency could concur. The bank's position can be bolstered by a
supportive home-state banking department that can attest that its
supervision and examination lead to a substantively parallel result
to the one sought by the host state. A host-state banking




VIII. POSSIBLE ACTIONS FOR MAINTAINING BALANCE IN THE
DUAL BANKING SYSTEM
All banks have a stake in a strong dual banking system that
provides the financial system with the strength and innovation that
comes from a diversity of institutions and parallel regulatory
regimes pursuing common goals of safety-and soundness, consumer
protection, and operational efficiency. Such a system also provides
each bank with a meaningful choice of charters and encourages all
regulators to remain lean and responsive as they pursue their
statutory missions. A strong dual banking system requires a critical
mass of institutions in each system to provide the political and
financial foundation for the regulatory structure on each side. In
the last decade, the consolidation of state and national bank
affiliates into interstate banks under a national bank charter has
significantly eroded the institutional base in a number of states. The
importance of the further development of federal preemption to
national banks and the OCC has added to an apparent tilt in the
national bank direction and fostered reluctance by banks to appear
to be supporting the state side of the dual banking system.
To maintain the strength of the dual banking system, it
should be possible to build on the existing statutory foundation to
ensure that state banks have substantially the same ability as
national banks to operate under a uniform legal and regulatory
framework based on their charter law. This, of course, is no small
task and involves the effective use of the resources of existing state
and federal supervisors of state banks, the roles of these federal
and state regulators in resolving specific "applicable law" issues,
and mechanisms to prevent "competition in laxity" by any home
state. The following are examples of initiatives that could be taken
with regulatory agencies, particularly the FDIC, in litigation and
in carefully tailored legislative amendments that do not open up a
Pandora's box of broader issues and concerns.
A. FDIC Rulemaking
For example, one or more state banks might petition the
FDIC to use its rulemaking authority under 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(g)
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to adopt a rule concerning federal preemption for the benefit of
state banks that would parallel rules adopted by the OCC and
OTS generally describing preemption for national banks and
federal thrifts. An FDIC rule adopted in a notice-and-comment
rulemaking implementing the statutory provisions discussed above
should receive Chevron deference if subjected to judicial review.
B. Amicus Briefs
Briefs on behalf of state-chartered institutions might be
filed in cases in which federal institutions are asserting that state
statutes are preempted. Using arguments based on Riegle-Neal II
and § 104, as well as the commerce clause, states banks can
provide courts with federal statutory arguments supporting
parallel relief. Judicial gloss would give state banks greater
certainty about the scope of these federal statutes.
C. Targeted Amendments
An example discussed above is the CSBS amendment
revising § 105 of Riegle-Neal to clarify the primacy of the home
state regulator and to limit the ability of host states to examine or
impose fees on out-of-state state banks that have branches in that
host state. That amendment would supplement Riegle-Neal II,
which addressed only applicable law. There are other state bank
provisions enacted in the 1994 statute that might be amended to
conform to the parity under home state law policy of Riegle-Neal
II, without in any way undercutting the potential scope of Riegle-
Neal II.
D. Dual Banking System Working Group
Given the inevitable limited resources, an ad hoc working
group of state and national banks and trade associations could
help identify opportunities, set priorities and provide resources for
a concerted set of actions directed to maintaining the existing
competitive balance in the dual banking system.
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Genuine charter choice in the dual banking system has
been a fundamental feature of the U.S. banking system. The
dynamic at the heart of the dual banking system has been
functionally important in the development of both modern banks
and state and federal regulatory agencies that are flexible and
responsive as they pursue their safety-and-soundness, consumer
protection and other missions. The challenge now to bankers and
regulators alike is to complete the modernization of the dual
banking system in the present interstate banking environment and
thus preserve its historic and valuable function.
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